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The role of the Internet in promoting 
transnational recruitment for armed 
groups, particularly “terrorist” organisa-
tions, is often taken for granted. In re-
ality, the evidence is far from clear-cut. 
Research on how contemporary armed 
groups use the Internet suggests that 
they themselves view the Internet with 
considerable suspicion. Such accounts, 
however, fail to take account of an argu-
ably more important question: whether 
those groups which make extensive use 
of the Internet have actually been more 
effective in causing violence than groups 
which have either chosen not to use it, 
or which were operating before it came 
into existence. 
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By virtue of inhabiting the same planet as 
the rest of us, some insurgents, guerrillas, 
political radicals and “terrorists” use the 
Internet. Since they use it for business as 
well as pleasure, their uses of the Internet 
are naturally of interest to the states 
against which their activities are directed.
This would be nothing more than a state-
ment of the obvious, were it not for the 
fact that, for many years—and to some 
extent even today—the mere fact of terror-
ists using the Internet has been presented 
as something remarkable, shocking, 
alarming and inherently transformative. 
Merely by using email, for example, or 
browsing publicly accessible websites, 
terrorists are, in the policy jargon, engag-
ing in “misuse” or “abuse” of the Internet—
as if the Internet were inherently reserved 
for morally sanctioned or legal practices, 
or as if escaping from a bank robbery in a 
getaway car represents a “misuse” or 
“abuse” of the roads.
In reality, while there is now some interest-
ing research available exploring the spe-
cific online practices of “terrorists” (almost 
always Sunni jihadists and, at a distant sec-
ond, far-right movements), there is very 
little systematic discussion of how much 
Internet use has fundamentally changed 
the nature of terrorism and political vio-
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lence, let alone whether it has tilted things 
in the terrorists’ favour.
In this article, I shall argue, both on the 
basis of what research does tell us, and 
what research has by and large failed to 
consider that there is little justification at 
present for believing that the Internet has 
profoundly reshaped the landscape of 
conflict in favour of insurgents and “terror-
ists.” While terrorist groups undoubtedly 
use and therefore presumably gain some 
perceived advantage from using the Inter-
net, it is by no means obvious that terrorist 
groups or terrorism more generally actu-
ally benefit from using the Internet, rela-
tively or even absolutely.
For many years, armed rebels were seen 
more as a threat to information techno-
logy than as its potential beneficiaries. Ste-
ven Levy (132) records how bombproof 
plexiglass windows were installed to pro-
tect programmers at MIT’s AI lab from pos-
sible attacks by the militant leftist splinter 
group, the Weather Underground. None-
theless, as computer networks gradually 
became available to the general public, 
concerns quickly started to be raised 
about, for example, the use of early elec-
tronic bulletin boards to bring together 
American neo-Nazis (Hoffman).
By the end of the 1990s, it was beginning 
to be observed that some groups that 
appeared in some national lists of terrorist 
organisations were maintaining their own 
websites. This observation quickly fed into 
a broader discussion going on in Western 
and particularly American strategic 
thought about asymmetric threats and 
“information warfare.” It also provided a 
new avenue for scholars of terrorism, who 
had long maintained that the phenome-
non was best understood as “violence as 
communication” (Schmid and de Graaf). 
Early publications on the phenomenon of 
terrorist use of the Internet, as it tended to 
be called, to distinguish it from the more 
sensationalistic notion of cyberterrorism, 
were not immune to some hyperbole 
themselves. A typical discussion went 
something like this: First, based on exam-
ples of online content, or (usually anec-
dotal) reports of terrorists who had used 
the Internet in some way, it would be 
deduced that terrorists were systemati-
cally “exploiting” the Internet as a “tool” in 
order to achieve some quite clearly 
defined organisational outcome. For 
example, content identified as being pro-
duced either by terrorist organisations or 
by their apparent sympathizers would be 
taken to amount to a systematic propa-
ganda strategy. Materials such as bomb-
making recipes or small arms instruction 
manuals were presented as evidence for 
the existence of a “virtual training camp” 
(Weimann). Online calls for involvement 
would be treated as equivalent to recruit-
ment and mobilization, and so on.
Second, the mere fact that apparent ter-
rorists were apparently achieving such 
things online would be assumed—at least 
implicitly—to constitute a new and greater 
threat than had existed previously. Just as 
the Internet made everything more effi-
cient, so the argument seemed to run, it 
would necessarily make terrorists more 
efficient. And furthermore, making terror-
ists more efficient necessarily must mean 
making them more efficient at causing 
carnage and mayhem—not, for example, 
at achieving political goals which might 
not be, in and of themselves, unjust or 
objectionable.
For substantive, relatively early work in this 
area we may look to scholars such as 
Gabriel Weimann, Maura Conway or Mar-
tin C. Libicki. But perhaps the clearest and 
most eloquent statement of the overall 
thrust of research in this area can be seen 
in Audrey Kurth Cronin’s attempt to see 
deep historical parallels between “cyber-
mobilisation” and the French revolution-
ary experience of levée en masse. As she 
argued:
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The means and ends of mass mobiliza-
tion are changing, bypassing the tra-
ditional state-centered approach that 
was the hallmark of the French Revolu-
tion and leaving advanced Western de-
mocracies merely to react to the results. 
Today’s dynamic social, economic, and 
political transitions are as important to 
war as were the changes at the end of 
the 18th century that Clausewitz ob-
served. Most important is the twenty-
first-century’s levée en masse, a mass 
networked mobilization that emerges 
from cyber-space with a direct impact 
on physical reality. Individually acces-
sible, ordinary networked communi-
cations such as personal computers, 
DVDs, videotapes, and cell phones are 
altering the nature of human social in-
teraction, thus also affecting the shape 
and outcome of domestic and interna-
tional conflict. (77)
At the heart of Cronin’s argument lies an 
important paradox which seems at least to 
hover around what is now a generation’s 
worth of attempts to understand the post-
Cold War order and, in particular, the rise 
of militant Islamism: the question of 
whether we are witnessing, in essence, a 
postmodern or a modern phenomenon.
On the one hand, Cronin’s article seeks to 
observe, in the ideological mobilisation of 
insurgents to battle the occupation of Iraq, 
a phenomenon closely akin to the raising 
of French citizens to defend and extend 
their revolution. (On this note, it is difficult 
to resist the temptation to compare the 
bloody, self-sacrificial ethic of a song like 
Ummati Qad Lāḥ Fajr, the informal anthem 
of IS, although of course this specific 
example postdates Cronin’s article).
On the other hand, she seeks to present 
cyber-mobilization as something funda-
mentally alien to the centralized, hierarchi-
cal spirit of nationalism as it emerged in 
Hobsbawm’s Age of Revolution—as some-
thing “individually accessible,” spatially 
fragmented, “networked.”
Behind this seeming tension in Cronin’s 
argument lies another tension in another 
argument: the thesis that networked forms 
of organisation would increasingly domi-
nate the landscape of conflict in the 21st 
century. Probably the leading exponents 
of this idea have been John Arquilla and 
David Ronfeldt, two analysts with RAND 
Corporation, who, through the 1990s, 
developed a theory of what they called 
“netwar.” For Ronfeldt, the network repre-
sents the dominant organisational princi-
ple of the emerging epoch of human his-
tory, distinct from tribal, hierarchical, and 
market-based forms of organisation. 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt assumed that the 
US, in particular, would in future find its 
hierarchically organised institutions 
increasingly in conflict with networks 
which, by virtue of their greater adaptabil-
ity and fluidity, would tend to outmaneu-
ver conventionally organised forces. This 
in turn would require US forces to become 
more networked, on the grounds that “it 
takes a network to beat a network.”
The central ambiguity in Arquilla and Ron-
feldt’s argument is this: On the one hand, 
they are keen to emphasize that networks 
obey a different logic than hierarchies, 
and therefore must be talked about in a 
new way. And yet, as military-strategic 
thinkers, they remain eager to retain at 
least one concept which seems quintes-
sential to the old hierarchical order: the 
notion of war. To be sure, “netwar” is a 
mercurial kind of war. Many of its attri-
butes more closely resemble what at first 
glance one might be tempted to call 
“peace.” For example, the decision by the 
Zapatista movement in Chiapas, Mexico, 
to lay down arms in favor of transnational 
advocacy is closely analysed by Ronfeldt 
et al. in The Zapatista Social Netwar in 
Mexico, as a case of the adoption of a “net-
war” strategy.
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But the “war” in netwar is not, it seems, 
merely metaphorical. If nothing else, it 
invokes binary notions of us and them, of 
blue teams and red, where “red” may be a 
network but is still unmistakably an “adver-
sary,” and where “us” is usually taken to 
mean not an equivalent network (such as 
the network of influential individuals 
underpinning a regime or a ruling class or 
a military-industrial complex or even a 
whole “civilisation”), but rather a set of 
clear institutions, such as a national mili-
tary. In short, it conflates, in the helpful ter-
minology of Internet governance expert 
Milton Mueller, two very different things: 
the “associative cluster” and the “network 
organisation.” The “network organisation” 
is what strategic thinkers like Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt presumably mean when they 
re commend more decentralization in the 
US military. The networks they see as the 
new enemies are sometimes presented as 
the same thing: for example, when groups 
like al-Qāʿida are presented as adopting a 
deliberate, top-down plan to reorganise 
into a “franchise” system. But often what is 
in fact being referred to—particularly 
online—looks more like the unbounded 
“associative cluster” consisting essentially 
of like-minded individuals who sometimes 
turn out to work in concert.
The issue of network organisations versus 
associative clusters is specifically impor-
tant when we come to consider what we 
now know about how terrorist (for which 
we can usually read jihadi-Salafist) groups 
have used the Internet. Here, the broad 
lesson that seems to have been learned by 
terrorists and counter-terrorists alike is 
that the Internet is viewed as a boon to the 
extent that the online insurgents are pre-
pared to use it as an open medium, and 
becomes a liability the moment there is 
any attempt to treat it as a secure environ-
ment appropriate for serious organisa-
tional activity.
Contrary to the idea of a “virtual safe 
haven” in which terrorists could freely 
plan, train, recruit, fundraise and case new 
operations, it has turned out that terrorists 
themselves view the Internet as a deeply 
problematic, often hostile medium to be 
treated with great caution (Torres Soriano; 
Hegghammer: ‘Interpersonal trust on 
jihadi forums’). Bomb-making instructions 
are often unreliable, and where good 
quality, vetted versions are to be found, it 
is difficult to translate theoretical learning 
into reality (Stenersen; Kenney). Trying to 
form conspiracies online to do illegal 
things in communities where the mem-
bers have never met in person is an intel-
ligence officer’s dream come true. Indeed, 
we now know that possibly al-Qāʿida’s 
single most important and trusted online 
forum in 2009 was a joint creation of Saudi 
intelligence and the CIA (Hegghammer). 
Even the authenticity of propaganda con-
tent can’t always be trusted. The website 
tawhed.ws, run by the most influential 
jihadist clerics in the worlds (Brachman 
and McCants; Wagemakers), was for a 
long time the single most trusted online 
resource for jihadi-Salafi literature on the 
web. Eventually, however, rumours began 
to circulate as to how the esteemed clerics 
were able to continue to produce authen-
tic content while in jail, or under constant 
intelligence supervision. Jihadist advice 
for staying safe online—even in Western 
countries—has moved beyond the once 
universal advice not to try to “join the 
jihad” online, or to plot operations, to 
admonitions to not even publish or dis-
seminate content which might openly vio-
late anti-terrorism speech codes.
Moreover, the issue is not just one of oper-
ational security. It is also about the diffi-
culty of message control. al-Qāʿida’s lead-
ership turns out to have been deeply 
concerned about the risk of its message 
being distorted by its critics and its over-
enthusiastic supporters online, striving 
instead, with little success, to get respect-
able mass media coverage on the anniver-
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sary of 9/11 (“Letters from Abbottabad”). 
Islamic State—widely hailed as an unassail-
able paragon of Internet “savviness”—
would seem, in reality, to be little different. 
A leaked internal IS document called “Prin-
ciples for the Management of the Islamic 
State” (mubādāʾ fī idārat al-dawlat al-
islamiyya) reveals a rigidly hierarchical sys-
tem for the administration of media activi-
ties based on a system of “foundations” 
(muʾasasāt), each of which is directly 
answerable to the governors of each prov-
ince and, ultimately, to the caliphal diwan.
Despite all this, IS seems to be conflicted 
about its own message. The group is of 
course notorious for its “slick,” “sophisti-
cated” propaganda videos which promi-
nently feature the gory executions of the 
group’s many enemies.  Off the bat, one 
might imagine that this approach would 
be a poor way to sell the group to idealis-
tic young Muslims, either deeply affected 
by the human suffering of co-religionists, 
or aspiring to a utopian new society. But 
one also might imagine that IS had none-
theless thought through these problems 
and come to the conclusion that such gore 
was, in fact, effective. And yet, as turns out, 
it hadn’t. A report from ARA News Agency 
(Nasro) reveals internal concerns about 
image management as a result of execu-
tion videos, apparently coming from the 
very top of the organisation, which has 
since toned down its violent output and 
re-focused on presenting itself as admin-
istratively competent. By contrast, in its 
official English language magazine 
(al-Muhājira, “Slave Girls, or Prostitutes?”), 
IS picked a fight with its own online sup-
porters for misleadingly trying to suggest 
that the group did not practice sex-slavery.
Ultimately, the “netwar” lens through 
which so much analysis of “terrorist use of 
the Internet” is, explicitly or otherwise, pre-
sented misleads, because where infor-
mally bounded networks are in conflict, 
the size of the conflicting parties is in the 
eye of the beholder. For example, in the 
BBC World Service documentary “The 
Islamic State’s Social Media Machine,” the 
United States’ Think Again, Turn Away1 
counter-narrative program presents itself 
as “a rag tag guerrilla organisation waging 
a hit and run campaign […] the David 
against the ISIS Goliath.” This obviously 
absurd demarcation of the conflict illus-
trates how failing to think reflexively about 
the boundaries of competing networks 
can confuse.  The centralized media appa-
ratus of IS may indeed dwarf the resources 
of a tiny, experimental niche outfit within 
the Department of State. But for IS or 
al-Qāʿida, or indeed any insurgent group, 
violent or otherwise, the battle is not 
against some particular state “counter-nar-
rative” program. It is against the massed 
influence of every satellite channel, every 
ISP, every cinematic film. In this case it is 
against Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, the BBC, 
CNN, Buzzfeed, Rotana, Uturn Entertain-
ment, Al-Manar, and Anonymous. It is 
against nearly every opinion leader in 
society. It is against countless individual 
Twitter, Facebook or YouTube users deter-
mined to expose or lampoon.
In sum, the idea that terrorist groups are 
formidable masters of the Internet is cer-
tainly overblown, and probably a myth. 
Terrorist groups (and terrorist sympathiz-
ers) use the Internet, to be sure. But they 
use it ambivalently, against opponents 
who, for all their complaints to the con-
trary, hold most of the cards. In using the 
Internet, terrorists are, at best, running 
faster to stay in the same place.
But are they even doing that? A major 
problem with research into terrorist use 
of the Internet is that there is very little 
systematic comparison between the out-
comes for cases where the Internet was 
not used and cases where it was. And yet, 
prima facie, at least, it is by no means 
obvious that terrorist groups and other 
militants who have not had access to the 
Internet, or have made limited use of it, 
have been less effective on that account. 
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al-Qāʿida managed to simultaneously 
hijack four aircraft in an operation which 
made occasional and sometimes inci-
dental use of email and web searches. 
But the absence of such things didn’t 
prevent the PFLP from accomplishing 
much the same (albeit without the gory 
intent) in the 1970 Dawson’s Field hijack-
ings (Snow and Philips).
Measured solely by number and lethality 
of attacks, the Lord’s Resistance Army 
managed to become one of the most 
notoriously lethal and persistent armed 
groups without apparently ever register-
ing a single website. Much the same holds 
true for the Naxalites in India (Global Ter-
rorism Database).2 Even narrower com-
parisons seem possible, too. Consider, for 
example, two Iraqi groups: the Naqsh-
bandi Army and the Islamic Army in Iraq. 
Both were Sunni insurgent militias incor-
porating significant numbers of former 
Baathists and of apparently roughly simi-
lar significance. But while the Naqshbandi 
Army has produced a clutch of videos and 
maintained a website, its material is dis-
tinctly pedestrian compared with the 
extraordinarily innovative campaigns of 
the Islamic Army in Iraq, as represented by 
multimedia campaigns such as the “Bagh-
dad Sniper” videos or “Lee’s Life for Lies.” 
More research would be extremely valu-
able here, but it is far from obvious that 
this media imbalance was in any way rep-
licated in the field.
Perhaps even more remarkably, it is not 
obvious that the Internet has made a sig-
nificant difference even in the areas where 
it would seem almost impossible that it 
wouldn’t—that is, in its ability to transna-
tionalise conflict and radicalise a small but 
significant number of dispersed, marginal 
individuals into carrying out acts of vio-
lence at home. Media reports abound with 
tales of IS recruits (in particular) who 
underwent a mysterious transformation 
from ordinary sons or daughters to fanati-
cal militants after forming relationships 
with online recruiters online, and no doubt 
online interactions have played a larger or 
smaller role in the recruitment of some of 
the 5,000 citizens of Western states to 
fight for jihadist groups in the Syrian civil 
war, as well as convincing a much smaller 
number to attempt bombings, stabbings 
or shootings at home (The Soufan Group). 
But Anarchist terrorism in the late 19th 
century, as chronicled by historians such 
as Richard Jensen (36), produced massa-
cres and assassinations across Europe and 
North America which look strikingly simi-
lar in many ways (lethality, frequency, 
apparent lack of central organisation) to 
jihadist terrorism today.
Another obvious point of comparison for 
contemporary concerns about “foreign 
fighter” recruitment is the Spanish Civil 
War. What is striking here is not just that 
the patterns look similar, but that the num-
bers also look similar. Beevor (468, quot-
ing Lefebvre and Skoutlsky) reports that 
the International Brigades recruited 
around 32,000 fighters over the three-year 
course of the war—almost exactly the same 
number as the upper estimate of the num-
ber of international fighters who have trav-
elled to Syria and Iraq over the (so far) 
four-year duration of the Syrian Civil War, 
which The Soufan Group’s most recent 
report puts at between 27,000 and 31,000.
But a still more focused comparison can 
be made. Proportionately, the two largest 
contributors of recruits to the Spanish Civil 
War were France and Belgium, each of 
which contributed just over 0.02% of their 
respective national populations as of 1933 
to fight in the conflict.3 Today these two 
countries are also Europe’s most propor-
tionately important recruitment grounds 
for the Syrian-Iraqi civil war. Taking into 
account only the Muslim populations of 
these two countries (which between them 
account for nearly two-fifths of all recruit-
ment from Europe according to The Sou-
fan Group), reasoning arithmetically, 
France’s level of mobilization today stands 
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at 0.03% of its Muslim population (based 
on Pew Research’s estimate for the French 
Muslim population, 2015), Belgium’s, at 
0.08% of its Muslim population (also using 
the Pew figures). Even in the most extreme 
case, the proportion of the population 
mobilized remains firmly at the same 
order of magnitude. And this is without 
taking into account that presumably the 
entire population of France and Belgium 
was not realistically available to foreign 
fighter recruitment to the International Bri-
gades, whereas some of the foreign 
fighter recruits to jihadist groups in Syria 
and Iraq are recent converts, meaning that 
the non-Muslim population of these coun-
tries is arguably a relevant recruitment 
re servoir in this case as well. It also over-
looks the different timescales.
Indeed, the genuinely interesting ques-
tion about “terrorist” use of the Internet is 
arguably not how or whether the Internet 
has transformed militancy, but why (so far) 
it apparently hasn’t. Cronin was right to 
observe that the Internet has fundamen-
tally changed the way that ordinary peo-
ple communicate, across the entire world. 
Internet uptake statistics show that the age 
of the “digital divide” is rapidly coming to 
an end (“Internet Users in the World by 
Regions - 2015”). And yet the forms and 
methods of political violence we see today 
have not moved on. The basic practices of 
sub-state violence are the same as they 
were in the 1950s, and in many ways are 
closely reminiscent of what was happen-
ing (albeit in one small corner of the world) 
even in the 1890s. This may mean that what 
essentially causes political violence has 
little to do with how people communicate, 
but rather the fundamental nature of the 
relationships that this communication sus-
tains. Or it may simply mean that, much as 
the political consequences of printing 
took a good century and a half to bear fruit 
in Europe, the implications of the Internet 
for how conflict happens, and what con-
flict is about, simply haven’t borne fruit yet. 
But either way, it seems doubtful that the 
beneficiaries will be the “terrorists” of 
today who, while they may be drawing on 
transnational sentiment as a means, are 
still apparently trying, albeit not in condi-
tions of their own choosing, to set up the 
orderly, hierarchical, territorially limited, 
and patriotic polities of yesterday.
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